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Non-technical Summary
We analyse Polish active labour market policy (ALMP) training programmes from a
macroeconomic (regional) point of view. The empirical evidence gives some
tentative support to the view that public training programmes can be used to reduce
unemployment. In the specifications where significant effects of training
programmes can be detected, the average cost to reduce unemployment by one
person in Poland through training programmes lies between € 200 and € 500. These
costs are comparatively low in relation to the estimates for the Czech and Slovak
Republic (between € 1,000 and € 3,000). Our regional analysis shows that the costs
to reduce unemployment through training are higher in the industrial voivodships
(between € 500 and € 900), than in the agricultural ones (around € 100). No effects
of training could be detected in the modern voivodships.
It has to be stressed that positive training effects can only be found when using
register data. All model specifications that use Polish Labour Force Survey (PLFS)
data suggest that training has no effect on the outflows from unemployment. One
explanation of the sensitivity of the estimates with respect to the data set can be the
imprecision with which outflows from unemployment are measured in some
voivodships in the PLFS. Another explanation can be the different definitions of
unemployment in the two data sets. The register unemployment data may include
less long-term unemployed people than the PLFS data, because they might drop off
the register after unemployment benefits run out. Our estimates of the coefficients
on the unemployment stock in the matching functions are consistent with this
hypothesis, which leads to the conclusion that training works better for the more
able amongst the unemployed (as positive training effects are only found with the
register data). This is unsurprising as training requires the ability to acquire new
knowledge.
To test whether ALMP programmes have any displacement effects, or whether they
can prevent unemployment to occur in the first place, the effects of the programmes
on the outflows from employment into unemployment are estimated. We find no
convincing evidence on displacement effects. However, start-up loans seem to be
able to keep down the number of people who join the dole queue. Nevertheless,
those people who dare to take out a loan in order to run their own business are only a
small group and so the small costs estimated to keep a person in employment
through start-up loans (between € 100 and € 130) should not be interpreted as safe
evidence that an expansion of start-up loans would be successful. In addition, more
empirical evidence would be required on start-up loans, especially on the type and
length of self-employment, before any firm statements should be made.
Abstract
We analyse Polish active labour market policy (ALMP) training programmes from a
macroeconomic (regional) point of view. The effects of training programmes on the
outflows from unemployment and the effects of all ALMP programmes on the
outflows from employment (to identify displacement effects) are estimated. The
variety of specifications presented is revealing. In contrast to other studies on
Poland, we show that it can make a difference to the estimates whether current
ALMP expenditure is excluded from the set of regressors to reduce the endogeneity
problem, whether lagged dependent variables are included to take account of the
dynamics, and whether fixed or random effects models are estimated.
The empirical evidence gives some tentative support to the view that public training
programmes can be used to reduce unemployment.
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11 Introduction
Double-digit unemployment rates have made the central and eastern European
transition economies, including Poland, engage in active labour market policies.
Programmes included training, subsidised jobs (called intervention works in Poland)
and direct job creation (public works) as well as loan schemes (e.g. for self-
employment). As these programmes together swallow up about a third percent of
GDP in Poland (Franz, 1995), they should be evaluated as to whether they fulfill one
of their major objective, namely to decrease unemployment.
Emprical evaluations of active labour market programmes (ALMPs) in central and
eastern Europe have taken two major approaches in the professional literature:
microeconometric and macroeconometric. Whereas microeconometric studies
estimate the impact of a programme on the individual’s re-employment chances or
earnings, the advantages of macroeconometric studies are that they are capable of
capturing externalities by looking at aggregate data.
This paper takes the macroeconometric approach to ALMP evaluation for Poland
using the augmented matching function as the basic modelling concept. ALMPs may
not only have an effect on the participants themselves, but may very well have
effects on the non-participant unemployment population or even the employment
population. In Haskel and Jackman's (1988) terminology, substitution effects occur
when the subsidised activity would have occurred even without the subsidy, but
instead of employing an unemployed worker without subsidy, the employer now
takes on somebody who receives a subsidy from the labour office. If substitution
effects are prevalent, ALMPs do not increase the total outflows from unemployment
into employment, but merely alter the composition of the outflows.
Furthermore, macroeconomic data can also identify displacement effects.
Displacement effects occur when the hiring of a subsidised worker leads to a firing
of a non-subsidised worker. With displacement effects, ALMPs may not lower
unemployment in the economy as a whole, yet they benefit the participants and
increase the turnover of the unemployment pool. Given the stagnancy of the
unemployment pool in Poland, it has been argued that merely increasing its turnover
would be a positive achievement for equity reasons (Boeri, 1996). In this paper, we
will also test for the existence of displacement effects by estimating the dependence
of the outflows from employment into unemployment on expenditures on active
labour market policies. If displacement effects predominate, there should be both a
positive effect of ALMPs on the outflows from unemployment into employment and
on the outflows from employment into unemployment.
Of course, ALMPs may have no effects on the labour market at all. In this case, they
just constitute a deadweight loss through the waste of taxpayers’ money. If
2deadweight effects prevail, both macro- and microeconometric studies would
estimate the effects of ALMPs on employment to be zero.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we will introduce the concept of the
augmented matching function. A summary of empirical studies using augmented
matching functions is provided in Section 3. The data and variables which we use
for the empirical study are presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses some
econometric issues. The estimation results are displayed and discussed in Section 6,
followed by the conclusions in Section 7.
2 The (Augmented) Matching Function Approach
New work contracts (matches) are the outcome of a complex search process, in
which workers look for adequate jobs and firms look for adequate workers. The
matching function is a macroeconomic concept which aims to summarise the
outcome of this complex reality. This is done by relating hirings of workers to a
minimum set of determining variables. The basic tenet of the matching function is to
model matches of unemployed workers with vacancies as outcomes of a production
process which has stocks of unemployed and vacancies as its main inputs
(Blanchard and Diamond, 1989; 1990; Pissarides, 1990). Pissarides (1990) develops
a macroeconomic model of equilibrium unemployment with the matching function
as a main ingredient to it. In Pissarides’ (1990, Chapter 4) model, constant returns to
scale in the matching function are assumed to ensure the uniqueness of equilibrium.
This simplification may seem rather arbitrary. However, there is empirical evidence
for the existence of a constant returns to scale matching function of a Cobb-Douglas
form for many economies. The matching function has thus become an attractive tool
for analysing labour market flows empirically.
The microeconomic foundation of the matching function is that both workers and
firms have to search for their appropriate match in a world of uncertainty. The
inclusion of uncertainty is an extension to the standard neoclassical model where all
information in the economy permeates instantaneously through to all agents. With
uncertainty and transaction costs, a worker will receive a number of job offers in a
specific interval which is drawn from some known or unknown distribution. He or
she then has to decide whether to accept that offer or wait for a better one to arrive.
Similarly, a firm with a vacancy will receive a number of job applications and has to
decide whether to employ somebody of the applicants or whether to leave the
vacancy open and wait for a more qualified worker to apply for the job. Clearly, the
more unemployed people and vacancies there are in the economy, the more contacts
will be established between workers and vacancies. As a consequence, the expected
number of matches (hirings) will increase. Constant returns to scale in the matching
function means that if the labour market were twice as large in terms of unemployed
people and vacancies, the number of matches would be twice as large, too.
Increasing or decreasing returns to matching, on the other hand, would mean that
3there are positive or negative externalities with respect to the size of the labour
market, which increase or decrease the matching efficiency, respectively.
A weakness of the matching function concept is that it does not consider job-to-job
transitions. The assumption is that vacancies are filled only with unemployed
people. However, there is some evidence for Hungary and the Czech and Slovak
Republics that many workers move from the public to the private sector without any
intervening unemployment spell (Boeri, 1994a; 1994b), which is also very common
in western countries (cf. Franz, 1996, Chapter 6, on western Germany). This also
seems plausible for Poland. Yet as data on job-to-job transitions are generally not
available, previous empirical implementations of the matching function had to put
up with ignoring this phenomenon. Although this is somewhat unsatisfactory,
econometric estimates of the matching function will still be unbiased as long as the
number of the employed persons searching for a job is proportional to the number of
unemployed persons searching for a job. So far it has not been possible to test this
assumption, though, because data on employed job searchers is not available to our
knowledge.
The Ordinary Matching Function
Formally, the matching function can be written:
( ),h Am U V=
where h  are new hirings (matches, outflows from unemployment into employment),
U  and V  are the stocks of unemployed persons and vacancies, respectively, and m  is
a continuous non-constant function. A  is the mismatch parameter (the higher A , the
smaller the mismatch between the unemployed and vacancies). Thus A  can capture
a variety of factors. Amongst the most important are occupational mismatch,
geographical mismatch, the efficiency of labour market institutions like the public
employment service in creating matches, as well as preferences and institutionally
set incentives which influence the search behaviour of the agents.
Specifying the matching process by a Cobb-Douglas production function we get
h AU Vb g=
Taking logarithms on both sides and allowing for some random variation in hirings,
we can formulate the following regression equation
( ) ( ) ( )ln ln lnt t t th U V ta b g d e= + + + +
where ( )ln t tA ta d e= + + . d  is the coefficient on the deterministic time trend which
accounts for changes in matching efficiency over time.
4The Augmented Matching Function
In the ordinary matching function, the unemployed are treated as a homogenous pool
of people. Lehmann (1995) taking up the concept of the search effectiveness of the
unemployed by Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991, Chapters 5 and 10) formulates
the augmented matching function as
( )h A U Vb gy=
where yU denotes the search effective stock of the unemployed, and y  is the
average search effectiveness of the unemployed people. The search effectiveness of
the unemployment stock may be reduced by a higher share of the long-term
unemployed in the total unemployment stock. ALMPs, on the other hand, can be
viewed as measures to increase the search effectiveness of the unemployment stock.
Following Lehmann (1995), we can thus decompose y  as
( )0
1 1
0 0 1 1 0 2 2 0
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where y 0  (0 10< £y ) is the search effectiveness index without any ALMP treatment,
T  is a weighted ALMP index of the set of R  different ALMP programmes Tr. The Tr
variables can be expenditures on ALMPs, stocks or outflows of participants, or a
combination of expenditures and participants in the programmes. y k0  is the effect of
the ALMP programmes on the search effectiveness of the unemployed.
Inserting the decomposition of y  into the Cobb-Douglas specification and taking
logarithms we get:
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )0ln ln ln 1 ln lnh A T U Vb y k b g= + + + +
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0ln ln ln ln 1 ln lnh A T U Vb y b k b g= + + + + +
For small kT  we can approximate the equation by
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0ln ln ln ln lnh A T U Vb y bk b g» + + + +
which is equal to
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 1 2 2ln ln ln ... ln lnR Rh A w T w T w T U Vb y bk bk bk b g» + + + + + + + .
We can therefore write the following regression equation:
5( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 2ln ln ln ...t t t t t R Rt th U V T T T ta b g f f f d e» + + + + + + + ,
where f bkr rw=  and ( ) ( )0ln lnt tA ta b y d e= + + + . Thus we can estimate the effects
f 1, ..., f R, of the active labour market programmes 1 to R  on the outflows from
unemployment to employment h . In the following section, we survey the previous
literature on augmented matching functions on central and eastern European
transition economies.
3 Studies on Augmented Matching Functions for Transition
Economies
The literature on augmented matching functions that estimate the effects of active
labour market programmes has so far mainly concentrated on transition economies,
although there are related approaches for western Germany and Britain (Haskel and
Jackman, 1988; Disney et al., 1992). In the following, we focus on the results
obtained for transition economies. There are studies on the Czech and Slovak
Republics (Burda and Lubyova, 1995; Svejnar, Terrell, and Münich, 1995; and
Boeri and Burda, 1996) and there is also some evidence on Poland in Lehmann
(1995), Góra, Lehmann, Socha, and Sztanderska (1996), Puhani and Steiner (1996;
1997), and Kwiatkowski and Tokarski (1997). We have found one study on Bulgaria
by Lenkova (1997), one on eastern Germany by Steiner et al. (1998), but have seen
no evidence on Hungary so far. Where possible, we have calculated the estimated
costs of increasing the outflow from unemployment into employment by one person
through ALMP programmes in euro.1 Table 1 on page 6 summarises the main
findings of the surveyed articles.
                                       
1 During the observation period, the euro did not exist yet. We take € 1 to be ECU 1.
6Table 1: Summary of Studies on Augmented Matching Functions for Transition Economies
Study Country Data Main Findings
Burda and Lubyova
(1995)
Czech
Republic
1992-1994 monthly panel for
76 labour office districts
Positive effects of ALMP expenditure, positive effects of
participants in ALMPs only in specification without lagged
dependent variables; CRS not rejected;
Estimated costs of an additional outflow: CSK 132,000
» € 3,428
Slovak
Republic
1992-1993 monthly panel for
38 labour office districts
Positive effects of ALMP expenditure; no effects of labour
office staff; CRS not rejected;
Estimated costs of an additional outflow: CSK 40,500
» € 1,052
Svejnar, Terrell, and
Münich (1995)
Czech
Republic
1992-1993 annual cross
sections
Positive effect of ALMP expenditure per capita;
Estimated costs of an additional outflow: CSK 69,616
» € 1,808
Slovak
Republic
1992-1993 annual cross
sections
no effect of ALMP expenditure per capita
Lehmann (1995); and
Góra, Lehmann, Socha,
and Sztanderska (1996)
Poland 1993-1994 quarterly panel for
49 voivodships
no effect of training expenditure
Puhani and Steiner
(1996; 1997)
Poland 1993-1994 quarterly panel for
49 voivodships
no effects of expenditure on training, intervention works, nor
public works
Boeri and Burda (1996) Czech
Republic
1991-1994 quarterly panel for
76 labour office districts
Positive effect of ALMP expenditure;
Estimated costs of an additional outflow: CSK 43,000
» € 1,250 (both numbers given by authors)
(continued on the next page)
7Table 1: Summary of Studies on Augmented Matching Functions for Transition Economies (ctd.)
Study Country Data Main Findings
Lenkova (1997) Bulgaria 1994-1996 monthly time series no effects of training; Cobb-Douglas functional form not
rejected in favour of CES; increasing returns to scale,
although CRS not tested
Kwiatkowski and
Tokarski (1997)
Poland 1992-1996 quarterly panel for
49 voivodships
positive effects of intervention works, negative effects of
public works and loans to enterprises, no effects of training
and start-up loans;
estimated costs of an additional outflow through intervention
works: new PLZ 1,318
» € 446
Steiner et al. (1998) Eastern
Germany
1992-1997 monthly panel for
35 labour office districts
Very small positive effect of outflows from training
programmes (Fortbildungs- und Umschulungsmaßnahmen,
FuU) on outflows from unemployment; elasticity = 0.1
CRS not rejected
Notes: CRS: constant returns to scale; CES: constant elasticity of substitution; CSK: Czech(oslvakian) crowns; PLZ: Polish Zlotys; €: euro/ECU.
Source: exchange rates are taken from Deutsche Bundesbank (1992).
8The research carried out so far on empirical matching functions in both western and
eastern European countries suggests that the Cobb-Douglas specification of the
matching process provides an adequate description in most cases. The assumption of
a constant returns to scale matching function is in many cases empirically rejected.
However, Burda (1993) argues that this might be due to measurement bias, as firms
report vacancies more frequently when the labour market is tight. In addition, the
articles by Entorf (1995) as well as Burda and Profit (1996) show that
misspecification of the dynamics can lead to a rejection of the constant returns to
scale hypothesis.
Some authors have extended the standard specification by including the short-term
and the long-term unemployment pool as separate regressors. Here the results differ
between the United States and the central and eastern European transition
economies. Whereas the long-term unemployed exhibit the same search
effectiveness as the short-term unemployed in the United States (Blanchard and
Diamond, 1989; 1990), the long-term unemployed seem to be much more detached
and/or excluded from the labour market in central and eastern Europe (Boeri, 1994a;
1994b; Lehmann; 1995; Góra, Lehmann, Socha, and Sztanderska, 1996;
Kwiatkowski and Tokarski, 1997). Moreover, it has been shown that the matching
mechanism works differently in various types of regions (diversified/modern,
industrial, and agricultural ones), although no clear pattern has emerged from these
results (Boeri and Scarpetta, 1995; Burda and Profit, 1996).
As to the effects of ALMPs estimated from augmented matching functions, the
general results for the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Poland seem to be
mixed. Some studies find significant positive effects (Burda and Lubyova, 1995;
Svejnar, Terell, and Münich, 1995; Boeri and Burda, 1996; Kwiatkowski and
Tokarski, 1997), others cannot detect any impacts (Lehmann, 1995; Góra, Lehmann,
Socha, and Sztanderska, 1996; Puhani and Steiner, 1996; 1997; Lenkova, 1997).
Kwiatkowski and Tokarski (1997) even find negative effects of public works and
loans to enterprises on outflows from unemployment. When positive effects of
ALMPs show up, the estimated costs to get an unemployed worker back into
employment by way of ALMP programmes range between € 1,250 and € 3,430 for
the Czech Republic (Burda and Lubyova, 1995; Svejnar, Terrell, and Münich, 1995;
Boeri and Burda, 1996). Further, these costs were estimated to be € 1,052 for Slovak
ALMPs (Burda and Lubyova, 1995) and € 446 for Polish intervention works
(Kwiatkowski and Tokarski, 1997).
An important econometric issue addressed in Burda and Wyplosz (1994) is the
potential non-stationarity of the time series, which can lead to spurious regression
results. Further, the dynamics of labour market flows have been modelled
econometrically by experimenting with lagged dependent and independent variables
(Blanchard and Diamond, 1989; 1990; Entorf, 1995; Boeri and Burda, 1996). As
9pointed out by Boeri and Burda (1996), the question of endogeneity of the ALMP
variables is very important. Expenditures on ALMPs are in most countries allocated
to regional units according to the severity of the local labour market situation. As a
consequence, ALMP expenditure or participants variables may themselves be
dependent on outflows from unemployment. This endogeneity will most likely lead
to biased estimation results. Therefore, we address issues of dynamics and the
possible endogeneity of ALMPs in the empirical analysis below (see Sections 5 and
6). Before that we will present the data for Poland, though.
4 Data and Variables
We use two types of data. Our first data source is quarterly panel data from the
Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy2 on outflows from unemployment,
unemployment and vacancy stocks, as well as expenditures on the Polish ALMP
programmes (training, intervention works, public works, start-up loans, and loans
for enterprises). The data are available to us for all 49 voivodships between the first
quarter of 1992 until the last quarter of 1995. Some series also start during the last
quarter of 1991 and/or end at the first quarter of 1996.
Our second data source is the Polish Labour Force Survey (PLFS), which is a
quarterly survey of the Polish labour force which started in May 1992. The sample
size is around 50,000 persons each wave. Sampling in the PLFS takes place by
randomly drawing a number of households from Poland’s territorial statistical units
(TSUs) proportional to the population share of the TSUs. From the households
drawn, all members aged 15 and above are interviewed. Excluded from the
possibility of interview are the non-housing population (essentially the homeless,
people in group quarters, soldiers doing compulsory military service and the prison
population) and people living abroad at the time of interview. The PLFS is thus only
representative for the Polish population that does not fall into any of these
categories. Another factor limiting the representative character of the PLFS is the
fact that the non-interview rate varies with the size of the place of residence.
Whereas this rate was 6.5 percent in August 1993 for the whole of Poland, it was 24
percent in Warsaw, but only 1.6 percent in rural communities (Szarkowski and
Witkowski, 1994). However, for the other place-of-residence categories mentioned
in Szarkowski and Witkowski (1994), the highest non-interview rate is 8.2 percent
and the lowest 4.5 percent, so that the PLFS may show some, but hopefully not too
severe distortions in terms of representative character.
We can use the PLFS to calculate outflow rates from unemployment into
employment and vice versa. The advantage of using PLFS data lies in the fact that
                                       
2 We thank Professor Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, University of Lodz, for sending us this data.
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the classification of individuals into the three labour force states employment,
unemployment, and non-participation follows the definitions of the International
Labour Office (ILO). Accordingly, classified as employed are people who during the
week of interview earn money for at least one hour or who hold a job, but do not
work temporarily (e.g. because they are ill). Additionally, so-called unpaid family
workers are also classified as employed. Those people not employed are classified as
unemployed if they actively search for a job and are also ready to start work in the
week of interview or the following one. Anybody not falling into either of the two
labour force states employment or unemployed is classified as not being in the
labour force.
In order to estimate the total numbers of unemployed people and outflows from
unemployment from the PLFS, we divide the figures in the PLFS by the share of
people interviewed out of the total voivodship population. To calculate this share,
we need figures for the population aged 15 and above. Unfortunately, we were not
able to obtain this series, but only figures for the total population of Poland. Yet as
far as the population share of this age group did not change very much over the
observation period, the scaling error in our data will not bias any econometric
estimates except constant terms.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 compare the developments of the unemployment stock as well
as outflows from unemployment variables as measured in the register and PLFS data,
respectively. The figures depict the time series for the whole of Poland, which was
obtained by adding up the data for the 49 voivodships.
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Figure 1: The Development of Unemployment in Poland
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Sources: Polish Labour Force Survey (PLFS); Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (Register); own
calculations.
Figure 2: The Development of Outflows from Unemployment in Poland
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Sources: Polish Labour Force Survey (PLFS); Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (Register); own
calculations.
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Figure 1 shows that the unemployment stock is generally higher in the PLFS than in
the register data. This, however, is almost surely due to the just mentioned scaling
effect which occurs through the inclusion of people under 15 years of age in the
calculation of the population shares sampled in the PLFS. Kalaska and Witkowski
(1997) demonstrate that unemployment figures obtained from the PLFS are
generally lower than those from the register. Furthermore, the PLFS data show a
greater seasonal variation in unemployment than the register data. This is not an
unexpected result, as the register data are likely to be stronger driven by institutional
factors such as entitlement to unemployment benefit for a fixed period of usually 12
months. The PLFS data can be expected to reflect the search behaviour of the
unemployed more accurately due to the application of the ILO definition of
unemployment.
An even greater difference between the PLFS and register data emerges when
looking at the outflows from unemployment in Figure 2. The fact that the register
data exhibits higher outflows for most months is not surprising, as the register data
measures total outflows from the registers, whereas the PLFS data only measures
outflows to employment, which is what we are interested in. When using the total
outflows data from the register (because outflows to jobs are not available to us on
the voivodship level) we hope the movements in the two series to be proportional. In
this case, any estimation results would still be unbiased. However, as can be seen
from Figure 2, this proportionality assumption does not seem to hold between the
two data sources we observe here. Unfortunately, though, we cannot make a clear
statement on the validity of the proportionality assumption, as the difference in the
two series may stem from many factors. One is the just mentioned difference in the
type of outflow measures. Another one is the different definition of unemployment.
Further, the different data source per se may play a role. And finally, there might be
estimation errors when inferring from the PLFS on the total population.
The just discussed differences in concepts and measurements between the data
sources at hand warrant a sensitivity analysis with respect to the data set used.
Descriptive statistics for the data from both the Polish Ministry of Labour and Social
Policy and the Polish Labour Force Survey are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Panel Data
Variable Data Mean S.d. Min. Max. Observations
ln outflows from overall 2.149 0.745 0.352 4.377 N it 818
unemployment between 0.473 1.044 3.461 N i 49
(PLFS) within 0.583 0.033 4.311 N
t
16.69
ln unemployment stock overall 4.020 0.490 2.437 5.519 N it 882
(PLFS) between 0.463 2.890 5.418 N i 49
within 0.172 3.395 4.587 N t 18
ln outflows from overall 2.088 0.604 -0.223 3.813 N it 833
unemployment between 0.437 1.146 3.365 N i 49
(register) within 0.421 0.198 3.251 N t 17
ln unemployment stock overall 3.903 0.427 2.451 5.179 N it 882
(register) between 0.417 2.786 5.037 N i 49
within 0.111 3.459 4.184 N t 18
ln outflows from overall 1.853 0.685 0.353 4.377 N it 799
employment between 0.413 1.036 2.856 N i 49
(PLFS) within 0.554 -0.063 4.300 N
t
16.31
ln employment stock overall 5.847 0.498 4.732 7.569 N it 882
(PLFS) between 0.499 4.845 7.478 N i 49
within 0.063 5.627 6.071 N t 18
ln vancancy stock overall 0.927 0.827 -2.303 3.211 N it 833
(register) between 0.684 -0.364 2.734 N i 49
within 0.475 -1.185 2.312 N t 17
expenditure on training overall 0.308 0.441 0.000 3.808 N it 784
(register) between 0.343 0.015 1.816 N i 49
within 0.282 -1.342 2.300 N t 16
expenditure on overall 1.109 0.955 0.034 6.038 N it 784
intervention works between 0.673 0.255 3.141 N i 49
(register) within 0.684 -1.483 4.638 N t 16
expenditure on public overall 0.887 1.019 0.000 6.252 N it 784
works between 0.630 0.108 2.705 N i 49
(register) within 0.805 -1.818 4.867 N t 16
expenditure on loans for overall 0.156 0.256 0.000 4.554 N it 784
the unemployed between 0.116 0.002 0.730 N i 49
(register) within 0.229 -0.573 3.980 N t 16
expenditure on loans for overall 0.117 0.270 0.000 3.225 N it 784
enterprises between 0.161 0.001 0.840 N i 49
(register) within 0.217 -0.723 2.587 N t 16
Notes: The between data are formed by calculating the means over time by voivodship xi. ; the within data
are defined as x x xit i- +. , where the overall mean x  is added to equate the mean of all data (overall,
between, and within ); the unemployment and vacancy data are in logarithms (ln) of thousands, and ALMP
expenditure is in million real new PLZ (1995); S.d.: standard deviation.
Sources: Polish Labour Force Survey (PLFS); Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (Register); own
calculations.
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For some voivodships in the PLFS, we measure zero flows from unemployment to
employment or vice versa between two quarters. As in these voivodships only a
small number of people is sampled, zero flows in the sample should not be inferred
for the whole population. We therefore drop such observations. As a consequence,
the panel becomes unbalanced. Although the missing values are not random, they
will be treated as such, as their number is small and any method to model the
occurrence of missing values has to invoke additional assumptions.
The observation period generally goes from the first quarter of 1992 (second quarter
for PLFS data) to the last quarter of 1995. The register data are identical to those of
Kwiatkowski and Tokarski (1997). Boeri (1994a; 1994b) has a shorter observation
period from January 1992 to March 1993, but more observations, as his panel has
monthly time-series information. He states an OECD database as his data source
which is probably obtained from the Polish registers. Lehmann (1995), and Góra,
Lehmann, Socha, and Sztanderska (1996) also have a shorter observation period
than us: they use quarterly register data from the first quarter of 1993 to the second
quarter of 1994. The only other studies on Poland also using PLFS data are the ones
by Puhani and Steiner (1996; 1997), who use PLFS data for the outflow variable and
combine them with administrative data on ALMP expenditures. The observation
period in these studies (1992 to 1993) is also shorter than in this work. As we have
the conceptual problem that outflows into any ALMP apart from training are
measured as outflows into employment, we can only identify the effects of training,
but not of any other ALMP programme, in our data.
Table 2 not only reports standard deviations for the pooled panel data (overall), but
also for the between (means over time) and within (deviation from means over time)
data. Glancing over the sizes of the standard deviations, we find both large within
and between variation in all variables. The fixed effects panel estimator only makes
use of the within information. However, the existence of a considerable between
variation in the data makes the random effects panel estimator potentially more
attractive, because it also makes use of the between information in the data.
Therefore, we will present both fixed and random effects models below.
5 Econometric Issues
Following Puhani and Steiner (1996; 1997), the endogeneity problem will be
addressed by lagging the ALMP variables. Lagging the ALMP expenditure variables
also accounts for the fact that it takes some time until these expenditures can have an
effect on the labour market. We also check the sensitivity of the results with respect
to the inclusion of current ALMP expenditure in the panel estimations.
15
Inconsistency due to Lagged Dependent Variables in Panel Estimations
It can be shown that both fixed and random effects estimators can be expressed as
OLS estimators on transformed models (see, e.g. Baltagi, 1995, Chapter 2) It can
also be shown that the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable amongst the
regressors  will induce a correlation between the error term and the regressors,
because the mean of the error terms over time  is by definition correlated with the
dependent variable. In the random effects case, the problem is even more severe, as
the lagged dependent variables are also correlated with the error term through the
unit-specific effects. Therefore, estimates with lagged dependent variables in panel
data will be inconsistent for fixed N t  and N i ® ¥ .
As a solution to this problem, instrumental variable estimators on a model in first
differences have been proposed in the literature (cf. Greene, 1997, Chapter 14).
Moreover, generalised method of moments estimators have been developed (Ahn
and Schmidt, 1995). However, Monte Carlo evidence suggests that the fixed effects
estimator, although biased, has a relatively small variance compared to the
instrumental variable and generalised method of moments estimators and therefore
does not necessarily perform worse in terms of mean square error (Kiviet, 1995).
The induced correlation through the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable is of
order 1 N t . That is to say, the greater Nt , the lower the induced correlation. As in
our matching function analyses below, Nt  will always be greater than eleven, we
hope that the problem of induced autocorrelation is attenuated in the fixed effects
models. But as we generally work in a small sample context, all proposed panel
estimators in the face of lagged dependent variables must be expected to yield biased
results.
Weighing up the Monte Carlo research by Kiviet (1995) we choose to apply the
fixed effects estimator because of its comparatively small dispersion (the random
effects estimates are also reported for comparative purposes). This has been the
approach in all studies surveyed above which include lagged dependent variables in
panel settings (Burda and Lubyova, 1995; Boeri and Burda, 1996; and Burda and
Profit, 1996). Although we will see below that the inclusion of lagged dependent
variables does not make a qualitative difference to the estimation results obtained, it
must be stressed that the estimation results with lagged dependent variables have to
be interpreted with a caveat.
6 Estimation Results
In the following two sections we report the estimation results. We do not use any
information on intervention or public works, though. We can only estimate the effect
of training measures, and no other ALMP programmes, on the outflows from
unemployment. The reason is that the total outflow as well as outflows to jobs
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variables include outflows to intervention and public works. Therefore, by definition
an inflow into a works programme leads to an outflow from the unemployment
register. Regressing any type of outflows on works programmes variables must
consequently yield upward-biased estimates. As trainees, unlike works programme
participants, stay on the unemployment register, training effects are identifiable from
our data. Section 6.1 presents the estimates of training expenditures on outflows
from unemployment. We can however, estimate the effects of all five ALMP
programmes on the outflows from employment. These are presented in Section 6.2.
6.1 Panel Evidence on the Effects of Training on the Outflows from
Unemployment
In the following, we present estimates of augmented matching functions on our
panel data sets. We first discuss the results on the data from the Polish registers and
then compare them with the ones from the Polish Labour Force Survey (PLFS). As
outlined in Section 4, only training programmes are evaluated here, because
participation in any other programme is measured as an outflow into employment.
Thus estimates on the other programmes would be biased. Because of the large
enough sample size, we will nevertheless include current expenditures on the other
ALMP programmes as control variables. Some of them turn out to be significant,
but they will not be discussed any further because it is difficult to make a statement
on the size of the bias.
Estimates Based on Register Data
Table 3 and Table 4 show the augmented matching function estimates on the panel
data from the Polish registers. The specifications in Table 4 unlike those in Table 3
include lagged dependent variables. Each table reports four regression results:
because of the potential endogeneity of training expenditures and the fact that it
takes time for these expenditures to become effective, we check whether the
exclusion of current expenditure makes any difference to the results. Furthermore,
we estimate each specification by both fixed and random effects models. In case the
Hausman (1978) test does not reject the random effects model, the random effects
estimates are more efficient than the fixed effects estimates.
The coefficient on unemployment is significant in all specifications and even larger
than the one on vacancies. This has also been found in the other studies on Poland
using panel data (see Boeri, 1994a; 1994b; Boeri and Scarpetta, 1995; Lehmann,
1995; and Kwiatkowski and Tokarski, 1997). Random effects are rejected in favour
of fixed effects in all equations by the Hausman test. Constant returns to scale in
matching are not rejected in the specifications without lagged dependent variables
(Table 3). However, they are rejected in favour of increasing returns to scale when
lagged dependent variables are included (Table 4). Increasing returns to scale have
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not been found in previous studies on Poland. However, the difference between our
results and those of the other studies summarised above has an econometric
explanation. Neither Boeri (1994b), Boeri and Scarpetta (1995), Lehmann (1995),
nor Kwiatkowski and Tokarski (1997) control for voivodship effects. They simply
estimate pooled panel regressions. Only Boeri (1994a) estimates a random effects
model, but he rejects this specification by the Hausman test. Another difference to
the other studies on Poland is that they do not include lagged dependent variables.
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Table 3: Augmented Matching Function Estimates with Register Data without Lagged
Dependent Variables
Variable With current training expenditure Without current training expenditure
Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
ln unemployment (t-
1)
0.940 7.547 0.673 13.96 0.930 7.48 0.670 13.97
ln vacancies (t-1) 0.122 4.596 0.192 9.02 0.124 4.66 0.190 8.94
Training
expenditure
-0.043 -1.219 -0.020 -0.60 - - - -
Training exp. (t-1) 0.110 3.445 0.086 2.69 0.098 3.23 0.078 2.70
Training exp.(t-2) -0.047 -1.514 -0.045 -1.43 -0.045 -1.45 -0.046 -1.45
Training exp.(t-3) 0.052* 1.759 0.055* 1.95 0.062 2.15 0.057 2.04
IW expenditure -0.021 -1.072 -0.021 -1.20 -0.024 -1.27 -0.023 -1.30
PW expenditure 0.054 3.221 0.012 0.80 0.053 3.17 0.013 0.87
Start-up loans exp. 0.246 6.419 0.212 5.55 0.238 6.30 0.207 5.58
Loans to ent. exp. -0.005 -0.138 -0.032 -0.90 -0.016 -0.48 -0.038 -1.13
(fixed time effects omitted)
Constant -1.928 -4.024 -0.917 -5.27 -1.905 -3.98 -0.909 -5.23
R² overall 0.831 0.869 0.832 0.869
N i 49 49 49 49
N t 13 13 13 13
F/LM test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hausman test - 0.000 - 0.000
CRS test 0.622 0.002 0.670 0.001
Joint training test 0.006 0.023 0.005 0.001
Costs in PLZ 1,434 1,371 906 1,167
Costs in 485 464 306 395
Notes: shaded coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level; asterisked coefficients are significant at the
10 percent level;
IW.: intervention works; PW.: public works; Ent.: enterprises; CRS: constant returns to scale;
‘R² overall’ (as Stata calls it) is the correlation between the actual and predicted outflows;
the null hypothesis of the F/LM test is the non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; test results are
reported in terms of p-values, which means that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent significance
level if the p-value is smaller than 0.05;
the null hypotheses are non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; equality of random and fixed effects
estimates; constant returns to scale; all training variables equal to zero;
the costs in PLZ and costs in € are the estimated costs to increase the outflow from unemployment by one
person (at the mean);
the time effects are quarterly dummies.
Source: Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; own calculations.
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Table 4: Augmented Matching Function Estimates with Register Data with Lagged
Dependent Variables
Variable With current training expenditure Without current training expenditure
Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
ln outflows (t-1) 0.315 7.78 0.376 9.92 0.315 7.78 0.376 9.94
ln outflows (t-2) 0.129 3.59 0.130 3.60 0.130 3.69 0.130 3.64
ln outflows (t-3) -0.027 -0.88 -0.034 -1.13 -0.027 -0.88 -0.034 -1.13
ln outflows (t-4) 0.141 5.72 0.131 5.55 0.141 5.72 0.131 5.57
ln unemployment (t-1) 1.425 9.87 0.338 10.42 1.424 9.87 0.339 10.44
ln vacancies (t-1) 0.038 1.37 0.072 4.03 0.038 1.38 0.072 4.05
Training expenditure -0.007 -0.20 0.001 0.04 - - - -
Training exp. (t-1) 0.076 2.37 0.046 1.43 0.074 2.49 0.046 1.80
Training exp.(t-2) -0.062 -2.15 -0.083 -2.83 -0.062 -2.15 -0.083 -2.84
Training exp.(t-3) 0.065 2.39 0.042 1.68 0.067 2.52 0.042 1.68
IW expenditure -0.012 -0.63 -0.009 -0.69 -0.013 -0.67 -0.009 -0.69
PW expenditure 0.026 1.57 -0.014 -1.28 0.026 1.56 -0.014 -1.29
Start-up loans exp. 0.160 2.94 0.059 1.13 0.160 2.94 0.059 1.14
Loans to enterprises
exp.
-0.024 -0.69 -0.026 -0.79 -0.026 -0.77 -0.026 -0.82
(fixed time effects omitted)
Constant -4.915 -8.20 -0.791 -7.91 -4.914 -8.21 -0.791 -7.92
R² overall 0.8204 0.9205 0.8204 0.9205
N i 49 49 49 49
N t 12 12 12 12
F/LM test 0.000 0.247 0.000 0.247
Hausman test - 0.000 - 0.000
CRS test 0.000 0.565 0.000 0.559
Joint training test 0.020 0.076 0.009 0.037
Costs in PLZ 638 7,206 587 7,645
Costs in € 216 2,437 199 2,586
Notes: shaded coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level; asterisked coefficients are significant at the
10 percent level; IW.: intervention works; PW.: public works; Ent.: enterprises; CRS: constant returns to
scale; ‘R² overall’ (as Stata calls it) is the correlation between the actual and predicted outflows;
the null hypothesis of the F/LM test is the non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; test results are
reported in terms of p-values, which means that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent significance
level if the p-value is smaller than 0.05; the null hypotheses are non-existence of voivodship-specific effects;
equality of random and fixed effects estimates; constant returns to scale; all training variables equal to
zero; the costs in PLZ and costs in € are the estimated costs to increase the outflow from unemployment by
one person; the time effects are quarterly dummies.
Source: Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; own calculations.
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The estimates without lagged dependent variables in Table 3 show that training has
a positive influence on the outflow rate from unemployment. Although the Hausman
test always rejects the random effects model in favour of the fixed effects model, the
impact of training on outflows from unemployment does not vary very much
between the fixed and the random effects models. According to the estimation
results without lagged dependent variables, it costs about € 300 to € 500 to reduce
unemployment by one person through public training programmes. These estimates
are much lower than those for the Czech and Slovak Republics. There, the numbers
range between € 1,000 and € 3,500 (cf. Burda and Lubyova, 1995; Svejnar, Terrell,
and Münich, 1995; Boeri and Burda, 1996).
In the specifications with lagged dependent variables (Table 4), the estimated costs
get even smaller down to about € 200 in the fixed effects specifications. The random
effects models which estimate a cost around € 2,500 are rejected by the Hausman
test. As the lagged dependent variables are significant in all specifications, one may
infer that the cost for getting an additional worker into employment through training
is around € 200. This estimate is fairly robust to the inclusion of current training
expenditure amongst the set of regressors. However, as noted in Section 5, the
estimates with lagged dependent variables may be biased. But even if we infer that
the costs per outflow through training lie between € 300 to € 500, the conclusion
will be that training is comparatively effective.
Given the short observation period, we do not test for structural stability over time.
However, the persistent economic diversity of the Polish regions (Boeri 1994b;
Kwiatkowski and Gawronska, 1995; Kwiatkowski and Kubiak, 1998; Steiner and
Kwiatkowski, 1995) warrants to test for structural stability between types of regions.
Following Boeri and Scarpetta (1995) and Burda and Profit (1996), we estimate the
just presented regressions separately for modern, industrial, and agricultural
voivodships, respectively. The geographical distribution of these groups of
voivodships is depicted in the map of Figure 5 in the appendix. Regression results
are presented in Table 5 to Table 10. Except in Table 5 and in the last equation of
Table 9, the random effects model is rejected by the Hausman test.
As in our regressions for the whole of Poland, but unlike in Boeri and Scarpetta
(1995), constant returns to scale are not rejected in the specifications without lagged
dependent variables (Table 5, Table 7, and Table 9). Our coefficients on
unemployment and vacancies for modern (diversified) and agricultural voivodships
are similar to those found in Boeri and Scarpetta (1995) despite of their slightly
different classification of the voivodships. In both cases, the coefficient on
unemployment is around four times as large as the one on vacancies. However, for
the industrial voivodships, the coefficients on the two ‘inputs’ for the matching
process are about equal in Boeri and Scarpetta’s (1995) regression, whereas we find
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the coefficient on unemployment to be about eleven times as large as the one on
vacancies.
When lagged dependent variables are included in the equations, the hypothesis of
constant returns to scale is rejected for all types of regions (see, Table 6, Table 8,
and Table 10). We can thus substantiate the findings by Boeri and Burda (1996) and
Burda and Profit (1996) that a dynamic specification of the matching function can
make a decisive difference to the estimation results obtained. For modern
voivodships (Table 6), the coefficients on the vacancy variable are positive again.
Yet in the industrial voivodships, they are only marginally significantly different
from zero.
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Table 5: Augmented Matching Function Estimates with Register Data without Lagged
Dependent Variables - Modern Voivodships
Variable With current training expenditure Without current training expenditure
Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
ln unemployment (t-1) 1.070 4.36 0.611 4.31 1.070 4.36 0.625 4.51
ln vacancies (t-1) -0.017 -0.21 0.175 2.96 -0.028 -0.36 0.176 2.99
Training expenditure 0.081 0.97 0.056 0.58 - - - -
Training exp. (t-1) -0.064 -0.66 -0.097 -0.84 -0.020 -0.23 -0.058 -0.62
Training exp.(t-2) 0.087 0.89 0.046 0.39 0.085 0.87 0.048 0.41
Training exp.(t-3) 0.101 1.19 0.072 0.70 0.098 1.16 0.075 0.74
IW expenditure 0.123 2.69 -0.012 -0.31 0.121 2.65 -0.017 -0.42
PW expenditure 0.054 1.07 0.002 0.03 0.052 1.04 0.000 0.00
Start-up loans exp. 0.302 2.05 -0.031 -0.20 0.313 2.13 -0.026 -0.17
Loans to enterprises
exp.
-0.035 -0.32 -0.213* -1.80 -0.001 -0.01 -0.190* -1.72
(fixed time effects omitted)
Constant -2.386 -2.47 -0.494 -0.97 -2.333 -2.42 -0.527 -1.04
R² overall 0.417 0.787 0.400 0.786
N i 8 8 8 8
N t 13 13 13 13
F/LM test 0.000 0.147 0.000 0.166
Hausman test - 0.610 - 0.425
CRS test 0.824 0.058 0.861 0.069
Joint training test 0.324 0.788 0.290 0.707
Notes: shaded coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level; asterisked coefficients are significant at the
10 percent level;
IW: intervention works; PW: public works; CRS: constant returns to scale;
‘R² overall’ (as Stata calls it) is the correlation between the actual and predicted outflows;
the null hypothesis of the F/LM test is the non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; test results are
reported in terms of p-values, which means that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent significance
level if the p-value is smaller than 0.05;
the null hypotheses are non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; equality of random and fixed effects
estimates; constant returns to scale; all training variables equal to zero;
the time effects are modelled by quarterly dummies.
Source: Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; own calculations.
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Table 6: Augmented Matching Function Estimates with Register Data with Lagged
Dependent Variables - Modern Voivodships
Variable With current training expenditure Without current training expenditure
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
ln outflows (t-1) 0.448 4.33 0.520 4.65 0.443 4.347 0.522 4.715
ln outflows (t-2) 0.216 2.79 0.168* 1.71 0.216 2.81 0.168* 1.72
ln outflows (t-3) 0.106 1.29 -0.097 -1.01 0.106 1.31 -0.098 -1.03
ln outflows (t-4) 0.200 2.80 0.044 0.58 0.195 2.80 0.046 0.62
ln unemployment (t-1) 2.719 6.90 0.406 2.95 2.692 7.01 0.411 3.08
ln vacancies (t-1) -0.162 -2.21 0.003 0.05 -0.158 -2.20 0.003 0.04
Training expenditure -0.026 -0.35 0.015 0.16 - - - -
Training exp. (t-1) -0.029 -0.36 -0.095 -0.94 -0.044 -0.63 -0.085 -1.07
Training exp.(t-2) 0.063 0.78 0.090 0.89 0.064 0.80 0.091 0.90
Training exp.(t-3) 0.046 0.66 0.009 0.10 0.047 0.68 0.009 0.11
IW expenditure 0.027 0.62 -0.004 -0.12 0.029 0.67 -0.005 -0.15
PW expenditure 0.035 0.79 -0.054 -1.03 0.036 0.81 -0.055 -1.06
Start-up loans exp. -0.057 -0.40 -0.138 -0.84 -0.059 -0.42 -0.136 -0.84
Loans to enterprises
exp.
0.092 0.91 0.140 1.12 0.080 0.84 0.148 1.31
(fixed time effects omitted)
Constant -10.551 -6.08 -0.769 -1.53 -10.438 -6.16 -0.787 -1.62
R² overall 0.5731 0.8492 0.574 0.849
N i 8 8 8 8
N t 12 12 12 12
F/LM test 0.000 0.303 0.000 0.301
Hausman test - 0.016 - 0.0001
CRS test 0.000 0.710 0.000 0.655
Joint training test 0.714 0.824 0.571 0.680
Notes: shaded coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level; asterisked coefficients are significant at the
10 percent level; IW: intervention works; PW: public works; CRS: constant returns to scale; ‘R² overall’ (as
Stata calls it) is the correlation between the actual and predicted outflows;
the null hypothesis of the F/LM test is the non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; test results are
reported in terms of p-values, which means that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent significance
level if the p-value is smaller than 0.05;
the null hypotheses are non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; equality of random and fixed effects
estimates; constant returns to scale; all training variables equal to zero;
the time effects are modelled by quarterly dummies.
Source: Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; own calculations.
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Table 7: Augmented Matching Function Estimates with Register Data without Lagged
Dependent Variables - Industrial Voivodships
Variable With current training expenditure Without current training expenditure
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
ln unemployment (t-1) 1.111 5.10 0.697 7.32 0.981 4.53 0.708 6.93
ln vacancies (t-1) 0.098 2.07 0.179 4.19 0.080* 1.67 0.146 3.43
Training expenditure -0.116 -2.81 -0.047 -1.20 - - - -
Training exp. (t-1) 0.065 2.02 0.072 2.17 0.050 1.533 0.058* 1.85
Training exp.(t-2) -0.059* -1.82 -0.034 -1.03 -0.049 -1.50 -0.037 -1.14
Training exp.(t-3) -0.007 -0.21 0.044 1.39 0.027 0.86 0.046 1.53
IW expenditure -0.063 -2.34 -0.060 -2.30 -0.086 -3.28 -0.075 -3.04
PW expenditure 0.078 3.86 0.029 1.57 0.077 3.72 0.043 2.27
Start-up loans exp. 0.174 4.56 0.192 4.88 0.162 4.21 0.178 4.66
Loans to enterprises
exp.
0.025 0.72 0.007 0.21 -0.003 -0.08 -0.004 -0.12
(fixed time effects omitted)
Constant -2.484 -2.80 -0.929 -2.56 -1.996 -2.25 -0.957 -2.43
R² overall 0.853 0.860 0.806 0.854
N i 17 17 17 17
N t 13 13 13 13
F/LM test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hausman test - 0.0202 - 0.472
CRS test 0.348 0.165 0.782 0.120
Joint training test 0.020 0.120 0.271 0.160
Costs in PLZ -894.20 3,063.34 3,838.29 1,539.87
Costs in € -302.46 1,036.16 1,298.28 520.85
Notes: shaded coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level; asterisked coefficients are significant at the
10 percent level;
IW: intervention works; PW: public works; CRS: constant returns to scale;
‘R² overall’ (as Stata calls it) is the correlation between the actual and predicted outflows;
the null hypothesis of the F/LM test is the non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; test results are
reported in terms of p-values, which means that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent significance
level if the p-value is smaller than 0.05;
the null hypotheses are non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; equality of random and fixed effects
estimates; constant returns to scale; all training variables equal to zero;
the costs in PLZ and costs in € are the estimated costs to increase the outflow from unemployment by one
person (at the mean);
the time effects are modelled by quarterly dummies.
Source: Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; own calculations.
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Table 8: Augmented Matching Function Estimates with Register Data with Lagged
Dependent Variables - Industrial Voivodships
Variable With current training expenditure Without current training expenditure
Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
ln outflows (t-1) 0.256 3.74 0.375 5.94 0.265 3.83 0.372 5.92
ln outflows (t-2) 0.022 0.37 0.067 1.12 0.052 0.90 0.075 1.28
ln outflows (t-3) -0.002 -0.04 0.020 0.38 -0.004 -0.08 0.016 0.30
ln outflows (t-4) 0.108 2.75 0.118 3.10 0.104 2.64 0.115 3.05
ln unemployment (t-1) 1.218 4.81 0.316 5.78 1.117 4.45 0.313 5.75
ln vacancies (t-1) 0.085* 1.75 0.102 3.15 0.073 1.49 0.099 3.09
Training expenditure -0.091 -2.07 -0.025 -0.69 - - - -
Training exp. (t-1) 0.073 2.05 0.079 2.26 0.053 1.53 0.066 2.25
Training exp.(t-2) -0.080 -2.44 -0.081 -2.54 -0.074 -2.24 -0.083 -2.60
Training exp.(t-3) 0.017 0.51 0.056 2.02 0.043 1.41 0.058 2.09
IW expenditure -0.032 -1.13 -0.032 -1.54 -0.045* -1.65 -0.036* -1.82
PW expenditure 0.043 1.96 0.002 0.13 0.037* 1.67 0.003 0.25
Start-up loans exp. 0.070 1.11 0.027 0.45 0.069 1.09 0.025 0.41
Loans to enterprises
exp.
-0.009 -0.26 -0.036 -1.08 -0.031 -0.91 -0.044 -1.37
(fixed time effects omitted)
Constant -3.969 -3.71 -0.711 -3.79 -3.639 -3.40 -0.690 -3.74
R² overall 0.8312 0.9307 0.845 0.931
N i 17 17 17 17
N t 12 12 12 12
F/LM test 0.008 0.389 0.024 0.393
Hausman test - 0.021 - 0.079
CRS test 0.014 0.959 0.030 0.808
Joint training test 0.027 0.031 0.080 0.017
Costs in PLZ -791 1,527 2,752 1,069
Costs in € -268 516 931 362
Notes: shaded coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level; asterisked coefficients are significant at the
10 percent level; IW: intervention works; PW: public works; CRS: constant returns to scale; ‘R² overall’ (as
Stata calls it) is the correlation between the actual and the predicted outflows;
the null hypothesis of the F/LM test is the non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; test results are
reported in terms of p-values, which means that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent significance
level if the p-value is smaller than 0.05; the null hypotheses are non-existence of voivodship-specific effects;
equality of random and fixed effects estimates; constant returns to scale; all training variables equal to
zero;
the costs in PLZ and costs in € are the estimated costs to increase the outflow from unemployment by one
person (at the mean); the time effects are modelled by quarterly dummies.
Source: Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; own calculations.
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Table 9: Augmented Matching Function Estimates with Register Data without Lagged
Dependent Variables - Agricultural Voivodships
Variable With current training expenditure Without current training expenditure
Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
ln unemployment (t-1) 0.803 3.57 0.628 11.84 0.811 3.62 0.614 9.53
ln vacancies (t-1) 0.182 3.88 0.179 5.46 0.182 3.88 0.176 4.81
Training expenditure 0.067 0.61 -0.033 -0.30 - - - -
Training exp. (t-1) 0.215* 1.68 0.160 1.18 0.253 2.24 0.183* 1.66
Training exp.(t-2) -0.091 -0.71 -0.092 -0.68 -0.102 -0.81 -0.094 -0.73
Training exp.(t-3) 0.124 1.11 0.007 0.06 0.118 1.06 0.048 0.44
IW expenditure -0.004 -0.07 0.049 1.20 0.001 0.02 0.032 0.73
PW expenditure 0.025 0.60 -0.013 -0.42 0.023 0.54 -0.008 -0.23
Start-up loans exp. 0.381 2.58 0.108 0.77 0.375 2.55 0.209 1.50
Loans to enterprises
exp.
-0.218 -1.32 -0.178 -1.06 -0.203 -1.25 -0.183 -1.13
(fixed time effects omitted)
Constant -1.468* -1.83 -0.752 -4.17 -1.482* -1.85 -0.735 -3.30
R² overall 0.797 0.824 0.799 0.8216
N i 20 20 20 20
N t 13 13 13 13
F/LM test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hausman test - 0.001 - 0.259
CRS test 0.951 0.001 0.979 0.002
Joint training test 0.177 0.810 0.114 0.413
Costs in PLZ 330.16 2,508.88 388.53 760.89
Costs in € 111.67 848.61 131.42 257.37
Notes: shaded coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level; asterisked coefficients are significant at the
10 percent level;
IW: intervention works; PW: public works; CRS: constant returns to scale;
‘R² overall’ (as Stata calls it) is the correlation between the actual and the predicted outflows;
the null hypothesis of the F/LM test is the non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; test results are
reported in terms of p-values, which means that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent significance
level if the p-value is smaller than 0.05;
the null hypotheses are non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; equality of random and fixed effects
estimates; constant returns to scale; all training variables equal to zero;
the costs in PLZ and costs in € are the estimated costs to increase the outflow from unemployment by one
person (at the mean);
the time effects are modelled by quarterly dummies.
Source: Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; own calculations.
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Table 10: Augmented Matching Function Estimates with Register Data with Lagged
Dependent Variables - Agricultural Voivodships
Variable With current training expenditure Without current training expenditure
Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
ln outflows (t-1) 0.257 3.60 0.301 4.89 0.260 3.63 0.301 4.89
ln outflows (t-2) 0.122* 1.93 0.119 2.03 0.115* 1.82 0.114* 1.96
ln outflows (t-3) 0.006 -0.12 -0.011 -0.24 -0.003 -0.06 -0.010 -0.21
ln outflows (t-4) 0.171 3.99 0.168 4.30 0.171 3.98 0.169 4.31
ln unemployment (t-1) 1.311 4.87 0.351 6.10 1.336 4.96 0.359 6.32
ln vacancies (t-1) 0.105 2.10 0.050 1.62 0.106 2.11 0.051* 1.66
Training expenditure 0.152 1.41 0.079 0.75 - - - -
Training exp. (t-1) 0.133 1.11 0.092 0.74 0.219 2.11 0.147 1.47
Training exp.(t-2) -0.097 -0.82 -0.116 -0.94 -0.124 -1.06 -0.129 -1.06
Training exp.(t-3) 0.066 0.64 -0.054 -0.54 0.051 0.50 -0.052 -0.53
IW expenditure 0.046 -0.84 0.012 0.36 -0.038 -0.70 0.013 0.37
PW expenditure 0.025 0.62 -0.033 -1.27 0.020 0.49 -0.033 -1.27
Start-up loans exp. 0.518 3.40 0.242* 1.73 0.505 3.31 0.244* 1.75
Loans to enterprises
exp.
0.207 -1.08 -0.156 -0.83 -0.197 -1.03 -0.147 -0.79
(fixed time effects omitted)
Constant -4.287 -4.09 -0.897 -5.76 -4.358 -4.15 -0.913 -5.93
R² overall 0.7429 0.8758 0.743 0.876
N i 20 20 20 20
N t 12 12 12 12
F/LM test 0.006 0.383 0.010 0.3671
Hausman test - 0.002 - 0.002
CRS test 0.007 0.660 0.0054 0.721
Joint training test 0.171 0.400 0.220 0.323
Costs in PLZ 186.98 37,380 324.90 -1315
Costs in € 63.24 12,643 109.90 -444.71
Notes: shaded coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level; asterisked coefficients are significant at the
10 percent level; IW: intervention works; PW: public works; CRS: constant returns to scale; ‘R² overall’ (as
Stata calls it) is the correlation between the actual and the predicted outflows;
the null hypothesis of the F/LM test is the non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; test results are
reported in terms of p-values, which means that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent significance
level if the p-value is smaller than 0.05; the null hypotheses are non-existence of voivodship-specific effects;
equality of random and fixed effects estimates; constant returns to scale; all training variables equal to
zero;
the costs in PLZ and costs in € are the estimated costs to increase the outflow from unemployment by one
person (at the mean); the time effects are modelled by quarterly dummies.
Source: Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; own calculations.
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There is also a difference in the estimated effects of training between the three types
of regions. The joint test on the training variables suggests that there are no effects
of training expenditure on the outflows from unemployment in the modern
voivodships.
For the industrial voivodships, the estimates are rather sensitive with respect to the
model specification. When current expenditure on training is included as a
regressor, the fixed effects model estimates a negative training effect, irrespective of
whether lagged dependent variables are included or not. Potential endogeneity
problems on the one hand, and time lags until training expenditure becomes
effective on the other, are reasons why one might want to leave out current training
expenditure from the set of regressors. We have seen in Table 3 and Table 4, that the
inclusion of current training expenditure does not make a real difference to the
estimation results for the whole of Poland. However, for the industrial voivodships
(Table 7 and Table 8), the inclusion of current training expenditure of the estimates
becomes decisive. The estimates with current training expenditure suggest that on
average, every € 300 spent on training programmes reduce the outflows from
unemployment by one person. By contrast, the estimates without current training
expenditure reveal that training can increase the number of outflows from
unemployment. The estimated cost to reduce unemployment by one person through
training varies between € 500 (random effects model without lagged dependent
variables in Table 7) and € 900 (fixed effect model with lagged dependent variables
in Table 8).
In the agricultural voivodships, the training variables are jointly (but not necessarily
individually) insignificant even at the 10 percent level in all specifications. Only if
one is willing to accept statistical significance at lower levels, positive training
effects can be detected. Indeed, the point estimates in the fixed effects models with
lagged dependent variables in Table 10 are rather astonishing. They would suggest
that reducing unemployment by one person in the agricultural voivodships only
costs between € 60 and € 110. Although we know that these estimates may be biased
due to the inclusion of lagged dependent variables (cf. Section 5), the specifications
without lagged dependent variables lead to similar conclusions. At the 12 percent
significance level, the fixed effects model without current training expenditure in
Table 9 estimates the costs of and additional outflow to be € 130. In the
corresponding random effects specification, the estimated costs are higher (€ 260,
which is still low), but insignificant.
McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) argue that econometricians should not exclusively
focus on the statistical significance of the variables in their models, but concentrate
on what is economically significant. The estimates for the agricultural voivodships
are a good example for the potential conflict between the two concepts of
significance: at standard levels of statistical significance, training has no effects at
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all. However, the 5 or 10 percent significance level, albeit common practice, are
arbitrary thresholds for the rejection of a null hypothesis. The point estimates of the
costs to reduce unemployment in the agricultural areas of Poland through training
programmes are very low. Hence they are of high economic significance. It has to be
left to the reader whether he or she is willing to accept estimates which are only safe
at a 12 percent significance level or lower.
We have not reported the training effects for modern voivodships in euro. In the
modern areas of Poland, the training variables are not even significantly different
from zero at the 50(!) percent significance level (if one ignores the fixed effect
estimates of Table 5, which are not efficient according to the Hausman test
statistics). We therefore believe that the training variables cannot be given a positive
interpretation for the modern voivodships.
Table 11 shows that the differences in the estimated training effects between the
modern, industrialised, and agricultural voivodships are not very sharp. We have
estimated joint regressions for pairs of two regions. In addition to the set of
regressors used above, we have included either all or only the training variables
multiplied by a dummy variable with value one for the second region and zero
otherwise. We then use the test on the joint significance of these compound
variables as a test on the equality of the coefficients between the two regions in
question. A plus sign in Table 11 signifies that the coefficients are statistically
different at least at the 10 percent level between the two regions. A minus sign
stands for no statistical difference.
It is shown that the matching functions as a whole differ between modern and
industrialised regions on the one hand, and modern and agricultural regions on the
other. The matching functions for the industrialised and agricultural regions do not
seem to be statistically distinguishable from each other. If one restricts the matching
functions between the regions to be equal in all respects except the training
coefficients, one does at least for the specifications without lagged dependent
variables hardly observe any difference in the training effect between the regions.
These test results suggest that the above-reported differences in the training effects
between the modern, industrialised, and agricultural voivodships might be
exaggerated. In particular, we cannot say that the training effect differs significantly
between the industrialised and agricultural voivodships.
We have also classified the voivodships into groups of high, medium, and low
unemployment regions as shown in Figure 4 in the appendix. The estimation results
for these subgroups are not reported here, but available from the author upon
request. Instead, we report the test results for the equality of coefficients between
these subgroups in Table 12. As the table shows, there are no significant differences
between these types of regions. This is valid for both the tests on all coefficients of
the matching function as well as the tests on the training coefficient only.
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Table 11: Tests of the Equality of Coefficients between Modern, Industrial, and
Agricultural Voivodships
Test Without lagged dependent variables With lagged dependent variables
With current
training
Without current
training
With current training Without current
training
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE
Test of the equality of all coefficients
Modern-industrialised + (+) - (+) + + + +
Modern-agricultural (+) + (+) + + + + +
Industrialised-agric. - - - - - - - -
Test of the equality of the training coefficients - all other coefficients restricted to be equal between regions
Modern-industrialised + + (+) + (-) - (-) -
Modern-agricultural - - - - - - - -
Industrialised-agric. + - - - + (-) - (-)
Notes: FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects;
‘+’ means that the coefficients are significantly different between the specified types of regions at the 5
percent level; ‘(+)’, ‘(-)’, and ‘-‘ signify that the coefficients are different at the 10 percent level, just not
different at the 10 percent level, and not significantly different, respectively.
Source: Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; own calculations.
Table 12: Tests of the Equality of Coefficients between High, Medium and Low
Unemployment Voivodships
Test Without lagged dependent variables With lagged dependent variables
With current training Without current
training
With current training Without current
training
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE
Test of the equality of all coefficients
Low U-medium U - - - - - - - -
Low U-high U (-) - (-) - - - - -
Medium U-high U - - - - - - - -
Test of the equality of the training coefficients – all other coefficients restricted to be equal between regions
Low U-medium U - - - - - - - -
Low U-high U - - - - - - - -
Medium U-high U - - - - - - - -
Note: FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects; U: unemployment.
‘+’ would mean that the coefficients are significantly different between the specified types of regions at the
5 percent level; ‘(+)’, ‘(-)’, and ‘-‘ signify that the coefficients are different at the 10 percent level, just not
different at the 10 percent level, and not significantly different, respectively.
Source: Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; own calculations.
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Estimates Based on Polish Labour Force Survey Data
Table 13 and Table 14 report the estimation results for the whole of Poland where
the outflow from unemployment and the stock of the unemployed variables are taken
from the Polish Labour Force Survey (PLFS). In contrast to the estimates from the
register data (Table 3), the Hausman test does not reject the random effects model in
the specifications without lagged dependent variables (Table 13). Including lagged
dependent variables leads to a rejection, though (Table 14). Constant returns to scale
are generally rejected in favour of decreasing returns, in contrast to our results based
on the register data, where we have found constant or increasing returns (Table 3
and Table 4). However, decreasing returns have been found in the previous studies
on Poland which have carried out tests on the issue (Boeri, 1994a; Boeri and
Scarpetta, 1995).
An interesting finding arises from the comparison between the results with lagged
dependent variables in the two data sets (Table 4 and Table 14). The estimated long-
run elasticity of outflows with respect to unemployment is much smaller when using
labour force survey (PLFS) data than when using register data. Indeed, the
significance of the unemployment variable is even called into question from the
PLFS data. Our estimation results suggest that the registered unemployed have a
higher search effectiveness than the unemployed according to the ILO criteria (not
working, looking for work, ready to start work). This finding is consistent with the
hypothesis that there are many people on the register who draw unemployment
benefits until their entitlement to benefits runs out and then find a job fairly quickly.
As the unemployment entitlement period generally lasts 12 months in Poland, one
may expect that, on the other hand, many long-term unemployed persons drop off
the register after that period and look for jobs through different channels (Boeri,
1994a). If this was true, then the registered unemployed would have a lower long-
term unemployment share than the unemployed according to the ILO definition in
the PLFS. That the two definitions of unemployment lead to rather distinct
unemployment populations has already been demonstrated in Figure 1 on page 11.
There it is shown that the number of unemployed according to the ILO definition
has a much greater cyclical component than the number of registered unemployed
people.
For our purposes, the most important finding from the regressions in Table 13 and
Table 14 is that the training variables become insignificant at the 5 percent level in
all specifications. The insignificance of the training variables is a robust result for
the PLFS data: like with the register data, we have also estimated separate
regressions for modern, industrial, agricultural, and low, medium, and high
unemployment voivodships. In none of the regressions were the training variables
significant. The results are not reported here, but can be obtained from the author
upon request.
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Table 13: Augmented Matching Function Estimates with PLFS Data without Lagged
Dependent Variables
Variable With current training expenditure Without current training expenditure
Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
ln unemployment (t-1) 0.213 1.368 0.600 6.09 0.218 1.40 0.574 5.71
ln vacancies (t-1) 0.253 2.785 0.229 3.74 0.260 2.86 0.231 3.71
Training expenditure -0.198* -1.669 -0.107 -1.04 - - - -
Training exp. (t-1) 0.103 0.946 0.138 1.33 0.048 0.46 0.085 0.93
Training exp.(t-2) 0.008 0.074 0.027 0.26 0.017 0.16 0.020 0.20
Training exp.(t-3) -0.138 -1.359 -0.070 -0.78 -0.094 -0.96 -0.066 -0.73
IW expenditure -0.026 -0.400 -0.017 -0.33 -0.042 -0.65 -0.023 -0.45
PW expenditure -0.051 -0.898 -0.063 -1.44 -0.055 -0.97 -0.058 -1.31
Start-up loans exp. -0.058 -0.445 -0.011 -0.09 -0.093 -0.73 -0.047 -0.40
Loans to enterprises
exp.
0.161 1.346 0.135 1.21 0.107 0.93 0.101 0.96
(fixed time effects omitted)
Constant 1.531 2.389 -0.096 -0.26 1.438 2.25 -0.019 -0.05
R² overall 0.340 0.431 0.378 0.430
N i 49 49 49 49
N
t
12.71 12.68 12.71 12.68
F/LM test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hausman test - 0.813 - 0.933
CRS test 0.002 0.030 0.003 0.015
Joint training test 0.392 0.629 0.724 0.679
Notes: shaded coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level; asterisked coefficients are significant at the
10 percent level;
IW: intervention works; PW: public works; CRS: constant returns to scale;
‘R² overall’ (as Stata calls it) is the correlation between the actual and the predicted outflows;
the null hypothesis of the F/LM test is the non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; test results are
reported in terms of p-values, which means that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent significance
level if the p-value is smaller than 0.05;
the null hypotheses are non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; equality of random and fixed effects
estimates; constant returns to scale; all training variables equal to zero;
the costs in PLZ and costs in € are the estimated costs to increase the outflow from unemployment by one
person (at the mean);
the time effects are modelled by quarterly dummies.
Source: Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; own calculations.
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Table 14: Augmented Matching Function Estimates with PLFS Data with Lagged
Dependent Variables
Variable With current training expenditure Without current training expenditure
Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
ln outflows (t-1) -0.133 -2.92 0.024 0.54 -0.136 -2.98 0.023 0.51
ln outflows (t-2) -0.099 -2.33 0.029 0.67 -0.100 -2.34 0.027 0.64
ln outflows (t-3) -0.050 -1.17 0.066 1.56 -0.048 -1.13 0.065 1.53
ln outflows (t-4) 0.023 0.53 0.124 2.88 0.026 0.60 0.124 2.90
ln unemployment (t-1) 0.282 1.63 0.486 4.25 0.299* 1.73 0.484 4.23
ln vacancies (t-1) 0.188* 1.94 0.159 2.73 0.196 2.02 0.153 2.64
Training expenditure -0.207* -1.69 -0.127 -1.14 - - - -
Training exp. (t-1) 0.131 1.15 0.137 1.21 0.058 0.55 0.061 0.66
Training exp.(t-2) 0.028 0.27 0.026 0.25 0.036 0.35 0.013 0.13
Training exp.(t-3) -0.116 -1.18 -0.065 -0.72 -0.075 -0.78 -0.065 -0.73
IW expenditure 0.010 0.15 -0.011 -0.23 -0.009 -0.14 -0.014 -0.31
PW expenditure -0.084 -1.42 -0.068* -1.69 -0.090 -1.52 -0.063 -1.58
Start-up loans exp. 0.010 0.06 0.074 0.40 0.007 0.04 0.058 0.31
Loans to enterprises
exp.
0.242* 1.95 0.146 1.24 0.184 1.54 0.104 0.92
(fixed time effects omitted)
Constant 1.648 2.32 -0.298 -0.76 1.529 2.16 -0.289 -0.74
R² overall 0.2289 0.4386 0.280 0.437
N i 48 48 48 48.000
N
t
11.15 10.64 11.15 10.64
F/LM test 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003
Hausman test - 0.000 - 0.000
CRS test 0.000 0.136 0.000 0.095
Joint training test 0.398 0.695 0.752 0.821
Notes: shaded coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level; asterisked coefficients are significant at the
10 percent level; IW.: intervention works; PW.: public works; CRS: constant returns to scale; ‘R² overall’
(as Stata calls it) is the correlation between the actual and the predicted outflows;
the null hypothesis of the F/LM test is the non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; test results are
reported in terms of p-values, which means that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent significance
level if the p-value is smaller than 0.05; the null hypotheses are non-existence of voivodship-specific effects;
equality of random and fixed effects estimates; constant returns to scale; all training variables equal to
zero;
the costs in PLZ and costs in € are the estimated costs to increase the outflow from unemployment by one
person; the time effects are modelled by quarterly dummies.
Source: Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; own calculations.
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To sum up, there is some evidence that training programmes can reduce
unemployment in the Polish labour market. However, this result is not very robust. It
depends both on the analysed data set and the type of voivodship. Doubts on
whether training programmes are of any use at all arise from the Polish Labour
Force Survey data. Using this data source we find no effects of training expenditure
on outflows to jobs. This is what has been argued in previous papers on Poland
(Lehmann, 1995; Puhani and Steiner, 1996; 1997; Kwiatkowski and Tokarski,
1997).
Augmented matching functions for the whole of Poland on register data suggest that
the cost of reducing unemployment by one person through training programmes lies
between € 300 to € 500. Compared to the estimates of studies on the Czech and
Slovak Republics, these figures seem rather low: Burda and Lubyova (1995),
Svejnar, Terrell, and Münich (1995), and Boeri and Burda (1996) have estimated
this cost to be between € 1,000 and € 3,500. In the previous literature on Poland no
positive effects of training could be detected. By identifying positive effects from
the register data, we differ from Lehmann (1995), Puhani and Steiner (1996; 1997),
and Kwiatkowski and Tokarski (1997). Our analysis by region, however, shows that
the positive training effects are mainly to be found in the industrialised voivodships,
and perhaps also in the agricultural ones. It might be an encouraging result that
training programmes are effective in those areas where the need to restructure the
economy away from the old staple industries and low-tech agriculture is most
urgent. These voivodships are not necessarily the ones with the highest
unemployment rates, however. Classifying voivodships into three groups according
to their unemployment rate shows no differences in the effects of training between
low and high unemployment regions.
6.2 Panel Evidence on the Effects of ALMP Programmes on the
Outflows from Employment
In this section, we investigate whether the Polish active labour market programmes
have any effects on the outflows from employment to unemployment. On the one
hand, ALMPs might encourage outflows from employment through displacement
effects as mentioned in the Introduction: employers might want to sack workers who
are employed without a subsidy in order to take on unemployed people whose wage
is partly subsidised. Such displacement effects are therefore most likely to occur due
to intervention works, public works, or loans to enterprises.
On the other hand, ALMPs might have a negative impact on outflows from
employment to unemployment by preventing workers from being sacked in the first
place. A priori consideration suggests that such effects may occur through training
programmes, intervention and public works schemes, as well as loans to enterprises.
Of course, displacement effects can overlap with the prevention of job losses. Hence
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we are at best able to identify the net result of these two effects with the data at
hand.
In order to estimate the effects of ALMPs on the outflows from employment into
unemployment, we use data from the PLFS on outflows from employment into
unemployment as well as the stock of the employed in each voivodship. Summary
statistics for the data have been presented in Table 2 in Section 4. Our model
specification does not have a compelling theoretical basis as the matching function,
but we use a comparable model regressing the outflows from employment into
unemployment on the current and past stocks of employment, as well as
expenditures on active labour market policies. As before, we also estimate the
models with lagged dependent variables. Fixed and random effects models are
estimated to control for any time-invariant unexplained heterogeneity between
voivodships which cannot be explained otherwise with our data.
The estimation results are presented in Table 15 and Table 16. In all models, the
specifications with lagged dependent variables show that their coefficients are
significant. The Hausman tests of the orthogonality of the random effects to the
regressors show that the random effects models are not rejected in the specification
without lagged dependent variables. In the specifications with lagged dependent
variables, though, the Hausman statistic always rejects the random effects model (as
one may expect). The table also reports tests on the joint significance of the ALMP
variables. If the effects are significant at the 10 percent level, the costs to prevent an
additional outflow from employment into unemployment are calculated in Table 17.
Positive numbers in Table 17 therefore mean that the ALMP programme in question
prevents outflows from employment into unemployment. Negative numbers can be
interpreted as evidence for displacement effects.
There is only evidence for displacement effects if current ALMP expenditure is
included in the set of regressors. In these specifications, we find displacement
effects for training and loans to enterprises. In the specification without lagged
dependent variables, there is also weakly significant evidence for displacement
effects in intervention works. But the sign of the effect changes when lagged
dependent variables are included. In this case, there is also weakly significant
evidence for displacement effects in public works. For training, it seems that an
additional € 100 spent on the programmes leads one more worker being displaced. If
we just consider the rough size of the estimate and compare it with the estimates of
the training effect on outflows from unemployment, we come to the conclusion that
training just turns over the unemployment pool. However, this interpretation should
not be taken too seriously, as we see that the displacement effect disappears
completely if we strike out current training expenditure from our model. It is in fact
quite probable that ALMP expenditures increase when more people lose their jobs.
In this case, current ALMP expenditure is an endogenous variable and its coefficient
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is likely to be severely upward biased (i.e. the estimated cost in Table 17 is
downward biased). This point applies to training as well as to public works and
loans to enterprises. It is nevertheless interesting to observe that we have some weak
evidence on displacement effects in loans for enterprises. However, these loans are
tied to the precondition that the firm receiving the loan has not reduced its
employment for the last 12 months. If there are displacement effects, then firms have
found a way to circumvent the spirit of this programme by sacking some of their
labour force a little later. Yet it should be stressed again that an alternative
explanation for the finding of displacement effects is that the statistical results
merely reflect endogeneity bias. This view is substantiated by the fact that no
displacement effects can be discerned from the estimates without current ALMP
expenditures.
We can draw firmer conclusions on start-up loans as programmes that can prevent
unemployment from occurring in the first place. Why start-up loans should prevent
outflows from employment may seem peculiar. An explanation can be that most
people receiving loans quit their old jobs as employees and more or less directly
become self-employed. As our data are collected quarterly, the period between job
switches must be under 3 months to make this hypothesis consistent with the
estimation results. Our estimates without current expenditure suggest that start-up
loans are a rather cheap way to keep people off the dole. The estimated costs per
person kept in employment range between € 100 and € 130. The estimated costs in
the other (not preferred) specifications are even lower.
In sum, we do not interpret the results from this section as evidence in favour of
displacement effects. The estimates which suggest such effects seem to be biased
due to the endogeneity of ALMP expenditures. Instead, we have found that start-up
loans can prevent people from becoming unemployed. The estimated costs to keep a
person in employment through start-up loans lie between € 100 and € 130, which is
very low. However, self-employment is only an option for the more capable
amongst the unemployed and can therefore only be applied successfully on a small
scale.
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Table 15: Estimation of Outflows from Employment without Lagged Dependent Variables
Variable With current ALMP expenditure Without current ALMP expenditure
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Employment 2.041 3.69 1.664 3.47 1.514 2.89 1.276 2.77
Employment (t-1) -2.163 -3.52 -2.313 -3.79 -1.633 -2.73 -1.764 -3.04
Employment (t-2) 1.904 2.91 1.595 2.57 1.566 2.48 1.404 2.35
Employment (t-3) -0.813 -1.25 -1.074* -1.67 -0.880 -1.38 -1.053* -1.69
Employment (t-4) 0.869 1.58 0.715 1.37 0.879* 1.66 0.758 1.52
Training 0.434 2.85 0.343 2.42 - - - -
Training (t-1) -0.257* -1.68 -0.348 -2.40 -0.135 -1.02 -0.176 -1.54
Training (t-2) 0.083 0.62 0.044 0.33 0.074 0.56 0.073 0.57
Training (t-3) 0.095 0.67 0.043 0.31 0.024 0.18 0.010 0.08
Training (t-4) 0.114 0.87 0.014 0.11 0.145 1.17 0.109 0.96
Intervention works -0.217 -2.40 -0.142* -1.70 - - - -
Intervention works (t-1) 0.052 0.53 0.077 0.78 -0.043 -0.52 -0.004 -0.05
Intervention works (t-2) 0.155 1.50 0.195* 1.90 0.151 1.55 0.164* 1.72
Intervention works (t-3) -0.090 -0.85 -0.077 -0.73 -0.119 -1.18 -0.107 -1.08
Intervention works (t-4) 0.069 0.75 0.056 0.62 0.021 0.23 0.035 0.40
Public works 0.070 0.93 0.062 0.90 - - - -
Public works (t-1) 0.071 0.94 0.067 0.92 0.081 1.20 0.082 1.32
Public works (t-2) 0.049 0.63 0.038 0.50 0.030 0.41 0.028 0.40
Public works (t-3) 0.052 0.64 0.043 0.54 0.003 0.03 0.006 0.08
Public works (t-4) -0.093 -1.26 -0.107 -1.46 -0.079 -1.12 -0.081 -1.18
Start-up loans -0.233 -0.96 -0.282 -1.20 - - - -
Start-up loans (t-1) 0.167 0.97 0.162 0.96 0.118 0.80 0.124 0.88
Start-up loans (t-2) -0.449 -2.81 -0.489 -3.14 -0.484 -3.12 -0.480 -3.19
Start-up loans (t-3) -0.009 -0.06 -0.061 -0.39 0.009 0.06 0.013 0.09
Start-up loans (t-4) -0.218 -1.37 -0.233 -1.52 -0.049 -0.33 -0.068 -0.47
(continued on the next page)
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Table 15: Estimation of Outflows from Employment without Lagged Dependent
Variables (ctd.)
Variable With current ALMP expenditure Without current ALMP expenditure
Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Loans to enterprises 0.343 2.17 0.366 2.49 - - - -
Loans to enterprises (t-1) 0.129 0.89 0.140 1.03 0.170 1.21 0.230* 1.78
Loans to enterprises (t-2) 0.021 0.15 0.000 0.00 -0.005 -0.04 0.021 0.16
Loans to enterprises (t-3) -0.063 -0.47 -0.097 -0.74 -0.018 -0.14 -0.019 -0.14
Loans to enterprises (t-4) -0.203 -1.49 -0.216* -1.66 -0.132 -1.03 -0.127 -1.02
(fixed time effects omitted)
Constant -9.152 -2.05 -1.748 -3.55 -7.000* -1.66 -2.273 -3.83
R² overall 0.271 0.361 0.270 0.330
N i 49 49 49 49
N
t
11.41 11.31 12.35 12.23
F/LM test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hausman test - 0.999 - 1.000
Joint test on training 0.033 0.120 0.380 0.405
Joint test on IW 0.130 0.075 0.602 0.321
Joint test on PW 0.364 0.197 0.427 0.348
Joint test on start-up
loans
0.056 0.004 0.028 0.016
Joint test on loans to ent. 0.156 0.050 0.640 0.390
Notes: shaded coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level; asterisked coefficients are significant at the
10 percent level;
IW: intervention works; PW: public works; ent.: enterprises;
‘R² overall’ (as Stata calls it) is the correlation between the actual and the predicted outflows;
the null hypothesis of the F/LM test is the non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; test results are
reported in terms of p-values, which means that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent significance
level if the p-value is smaller than 0.05;
the null hypotheses are non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; equality of random and fixed effects
estimates; all training etc. variables equal to zero;
the time effects are modelled by quarterly dummies.
Sources: PLFS; Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; own calculations.
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Table 16: Estimation of Outflows from Employment with Lagged Dependent Variables
Variable With current ALMP expenditure Without current ALMP expenditure
Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Outflows from empl. (t-1) -0.103 -2.11 0.114 2.48 -0.104 -2.17 0.107 2.36
Outflows from empl. (t-2) -0.211 -4.39 -0.045 -0.96 -0.218 -4.66 -0.040 -0.88
Outflows from empl. (t-3) -0.055 -1.14 0.088* 1.87 -0.063 -1.33 0.109 2.39
Outflows from empl. (t-4) -0.040 -0.80 0.112 2.38 -0.047 -0.99 0.113 2.49
Employment 2.378 3.87 2.042 3.74 1.737 2.93 1.599 2.98
Employment (t-1) -2.503 -3.63 -3.130 -4.34 -1.862 -2.75 -2.465 -3.49
Employment (t-2) 2.619 3.54 2.568 3.44 2.293 3.16 2.328 3.16
Employment (t-3) -1.327* -1.82 -1.718 -2.25 -1.302* -1.80 -1.747 -2.31
Employment (t-4) 0.818 1.34 0.618 1.05 0.906 1.54 0.673 1.17
Training 0.411 2.67 0.339 2.28 - - - -
Training (t-1) -0.180 -1.16 -0.321 -2.09 -0.068 -0.51 -0.156 -1.34
Training (t-2) 0.148 1.08 0.077 0.54 0.125 0.92 0.128 0.91
Training (t-3) 0.052 0.37 -0.009 -0.06 0.004 0.03 -0.056 -0.39
Training (t-4) 0.161 1.24 0.006 0.05 0.179 1.45 0.096 0.82
Intervention works -0.222 -2.41 -0.151* -1.75 - - - -
Intervention works (t-1) 0.039 0.39 0.093 0.89 -0.050 -0.58 0.030 0.37
Intervention works (t-2) 0.153 1.46 0.199* 1.82 0.130 1.30 0.150 1.44
Intervention works (t-3) -0.117 -1.09 -0.097 -0.86 -0.150 -1.45 -0.123 -1.13
Intervention works (t-4) 0.107 1.12 0.082 0.83 0.062 0.67 0.060 0.63
Public works 0.063 0.83 0.053 0.75 - - - -
Public works (t-1) 0.100 1.34 0.079 1.02 0.112* 1.64 0.087 1.36
Public works (t-2) 0.077 0.98 0.025 0.31 0.058 0.78 0.021 0.27
Public works (t-3) 0.088 1.08 0.039 0.46 0.042 0.53 0.001 0.02
Public works (t-4) -0.077 -1.02 -0.128* -1.64 -0.060 -0.83 -0.097 -1.30
Start-up loans -0.256 -1.04 -0.319 -1.31 - - - -
Start-up loans (t-1) 0.205 1.19 0.194 1.10 0.149 1.01 0.122 0.83
Start-up loans (t-2) -0.471 -2.93 -0.543 -3.31 -0.502 -3.20 -0.554 -3.41
Start-up loans (t-3) -0.006 -0.04 -0.023 -0.14 -0.005 -0.03 0.054 0.33
Start-up loans (t-4) -0.290* -1.78 -0.202 -1.24 -0.105 -0.68 -0.056 -0.36
(continued on the next page)
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Table 16: Estimation of Outflows from Employment with Lagged Dependent Variables
(ctd.)
Variable With current ALMP expenditure Without current ALMP expenditure
Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Loans to enterprises 0.376 2.41 0.357 2.35 - - - -
Loans to enterprises (t-1) 0.177 1.22 0.116 0.83 0.201 1.44 0.221* 1.67
Loans to enterprises (t-2) 0.072 0.52 0.004 0.03 0.067 0.50 0.029 0.21
Loans to enterprises (t-3) -0.050 -0.37 -0.130 -0.94 -0.002 -0.01 -0.073 -0.54
Loans to enterprises (t-4) -0.181 -1.33 -0.210 -1.56 -0.105 -0.82 -0.132 -1.00
(fixed time effects omitted)
Constant -9.371* -1.83 -1.104 -2.56 -8.356 -1.72 -1.387 -3.18
R² overall 0.235 0.383 0.221 0.349
N i 47 47 48 48
N
t
10.32 9.10 10.94 8.25
F/LM test 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.101
Hausman test - 0.000 - 0.000
Joint test on training 0.029 0.206 0.335 0.622
Joint test on IW 0.108 0.038 0.586 0.123
Joint test on PW 0.088 0.183 0.161 0.325
Joint test on start-up
loans
0.025 0.004 0.017 0.008
Joint test on loans to ent. 0.084 0.076 0.556 0.415
Notes: shaded coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level; asterisked coefficients are significant at the
10 percent level;
empl.: employment; IW: intervention works; PW: public works; ent.: enterprises;
‘R² overall’ (as Stata calls it) is the correlation between the actual and the predicted outflows;
the null hypothesis of the F/LM test is the non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; test results are
reported in terms of p-values, which means that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent significance
level if the p-value is smaller than 0.05;
the null hypotheses are non-existence of voivodship-specific effects; equality of random and fixed effects
estimates; all training etc. variables equal to zero;
the time effects are modelled by quarterly dummies.
Sources: PLFS; Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; own calculations.
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Table 17: Estimated Costs in Euro to Keep a Person Employed through ALMPs
ALMP programme Without lagged dependent variables
With current ALMP
expenditure
Without current
ALMP expenditure
Fixed
effects
Random
effects
Fixed
effects
Random
effects
Training -91 (-444) - -
Intervention works (1388) -392* - -
Public works - - - -
Start-up loans 57* 47 105 104
Loans to enterprises - -221 - -
With lagged dependent variables
Training -101 - - -
Intervention works 1460 -249 - -257
Public works -238* - - -
Start-up loans 73 35 132 70
Loans to enterprises -152* -227* - -
Notes: Numbers with an asterisk are only significant at the 10 percent level. Numbers in brackets are just
about not significant at the 10 percent level; numbers without brackets and asterisks are significant at the 5
percent level; if a number is negative, it might be interpreted as evidence in favour of displacement effects;
the bold numbers indicate the preferred models (fixed or random effects) as indicated by the Hausman test;
we generally prefer the models without current ALMP expenditure (4th and 5th columns) because they are
less likely to be affected by endogeneity bias.
Sources: PLFS; Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; own calculations.
7 Conclusions
We have analysed the Polish active labour market programmes from a
macroeconomic point of view. We estimated the effects of training programmes on
the outflows from unemployment and the effects of all ALMP programmes on the
outflows from employment. The variety of specifications we presented has been
revealing. In contrast to other studies on Poland, we have shown that it can make a
difference to the estimates whether current ALMP expenditure is excluded from the
set of regressors to reduce the endogeneity problem, whether lagged dependent
variables are included to take account of the dynamics, and whether fixed or random
effects models are estimated.
The empirical evidence from both the time-series as well as the panel data gives
some tentative support to the view that public training programmes can be used to
reduce unemployment. In the specifications where significant effects of training
programmes can be detected, the average cost to reduce unemployment by one
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person in Poland through training programmes lies between € 200 and € 500. That
these costs are comparatively low in relation to the estimates for the Czech and
Slovak Republic (between € 1,000 and € 3,000) speaks in favour of the Polish
training programmes. Our regional analysis has shown that the costs to reduce
unemployment through training are higher in the industrial voivodships (between €
500 and € 900), than in the agricultural ones (around € 100). No effects of training
could be detected in the modern voivodships. The persistent and large differences in
the development of Polish regions (cf. Kwiatkowski and Kubiak, 1998) may cause
social and economic challenges in the future which may go beyond the Polish
borders by way of emigration to western Europe (cf. Zimmermann, 1993). If this
tentative evidence on the regional effectiveness of public training can be given any
credence, training policies may be used to support a more equal development of
Polish regions.
However, it has to be stressed that positive training effects can only be found when
using register data. All model specifications that use Polish labour force survey
(PLFS) data suggest that training has no effect on the outflows from unemployment.
One explanation of the sensitivity of the estimates with respect to the data set can be
the imprecision with which outflows from unemployment are measured in some
voivodships in the PLFS. Another explanation can be the different definitions of
unemployment in the two data sets. The register unemployment data may include
less long-term unemployed people than the PLFS data, because they might drop off
the register after unemployment benefits run out. Our estimates of the coefficients
on the unemployment stock in the matching functions are consistent with this
hypothesis, which leads to the conclusion that training works better for the more
able amongst the unemployed (as positive training effects are only found with the
register data). This is unsurprising as training requires the ability to acquire new
knowledge.
To test whether ALMP programmes have any displacement effects, or whether they
can prevent unemployment to occur in the first place, we have estimated the effects
of the programmes on the outflows from employment into unemployment. We have
found no convincing evidence on displacement effects. However, start-up loans
seem to be able to keep down the number of people who join the dole queue.
Nevertheless, those people who dare to take out a loan in order to run their own
business are only a small group and so the small costs estimated to keep a person in
employment through start-up loans (between € 100 and € 130) should not be
interpreted as safe evidence that an expansion of start-up loans would be successful.
In addition, more empirical evidence would be required on start-up loans, especially
on the type and length of self-employment, before any firm statements should be
made.
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Appendix
Figure 3: The Voivodships of Poland – Map, Codes and Names
Code Name Code Name Code Name
1 Stoleczne Warszawskie 35 Krakowskie 69 Rzeszowskie
3 Bialskopodlaskie 37 Krosnienskie 71 Siedleckie
5 Bialostockie 39 Legnickie 73 Sieradzkie
7 Bielskie 41 Leszczynskie 75 Skierniewickie
9 Bydgoskie 43 Lubelskie 77 Slupskie
11 Chelmskie 45 Lomzynskie 79 Suwalskie
13 Ciechanowskie 47 Lodzkie 81 Szczecinskie
15 Czestochowskie 49 Nowosadeckie 83 Tarnobrzeskie
17 Elblaskie 51 Olsztynskie 85 Tarnowskie
19 Gdanskie 53 Opolskie 87 Torunskie
21 Gorzowskie 55 Ostroleckie 89 Walbrzyskie
23 Jeleniogorskie 57 Pilskie 91 Wloclawskie
25 Kaliskie 59 Piotrkowskie 93 Wroclawskie
27 Katowickie 61 Plockie 95 Zamojskie
29 Kieleckie 63 Poznanskie 97 Zielonogorskie
31 Koninskie 65 Przemyskie - -
33 Koszalinskie 67 Radomskie - -
Note: The voivodship codes are the standard codes used by the Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS).
Source: Puhani and Steiner (1996); RegioGraph 2.0 software.
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Figure 4: Unemployment Across Polish Voivodships
Notes: The black-(white-) shaded areas are the 15 voivodships with the highest (lowest) unemployment
rates. The 19 hatched voivodships have unemployment rates between those two groups.
Source: Polish Labour Force Survey May 1992; own calculations.
Figure 5: Modern, Industrial, and Agricultural Voivodships
Notes:  The striped voivodships are modern, the black ones industrial, the patterned ones agricultural, and
the white ones belong to none of these categories.
Source: Kwiatkowski and Gawronska (1995).
